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mechanics of the election and a translation of the electoral law in an
appendix. Dr. Radkey relegates to an inadequate footnote a statement of
the mechanics of the whole thing of which he is writing. Why does Dr.
Radkey think mechanics unimportant? The list system of voting which
was used is foreign to American readers, and it is often alleged in our
press to be the cornerstone of the new type of dictatorship which makes
periodic efforts to demonstrate that it rules with the consent of the
governed. Why does Dr. Radkey not consider the effect of proportional
representation on the vote, and the age requirement for the franchise?
Elections can be rigged through the electoral procedure and are not to be
evaluated for honesty only in terms of physical pressures brought at
the polls.
A decade ago Harry Dorosh in his study of the Constituent Assembly
entitled Russia's Struggle for Democracy, which was based upon far less
research than that of Dr. Radkey, discussed some of these matters of
legal concern. Dr. Radkey's ignoring of them presents this reviewer
with an occasion to raise his perennial complaint that historians pay
too little attention to the texts of laws and the skill of lawyers in affecting the course of history. Perhaps a lawyer may be permitted to say that
elemental forces are not all that control historical development. Dr.
Radkey has seen the possibility that the presence or absence of Roman
law concepts may have had profound influence upon the thinking of the
Russian peasant and hence on the outcome of the Revolution. One
wishes, however, that he might have appreciated that lawyers are not
always working on the periphery and that histories cannot be considered
complete which skim over their handiwork.
JOHN N. HAZARD.*
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By John P.
Frank. Chicago: Callahan & Company. Pp. xxviii, 1054 (1950). $8.75.
Following a pattern set by many authors of recent casebooks, Professor
John P. Frank of Yale has written a review of his Cases and Materials
on ConstitutionalLaw' in advance of publication. This practice not only
enables the readers of The Journalof Legal Education to learn something
of new teaching ways, but also gives them a standard whereby to measure
an author's performance against his announced intention.
In his advance review Professor Frank has told us that he is abandoning the doctrinal arrangement in his organization of materials because the
doctrines themselves are mere by-products of the great social issues and
problems which have given rise to constitutional litigation. He insists
doctrine is important, but that doctrinal arrangement is a poor way to
acquire doctrinal skill. His materials will be focused upon an institution,
the Supreme Court of the United States, and upon the basic social and
economic difficulties together with proposed legislative remedies which
give rise to constitutional questions. Doctrines which play similar roles
will be studied in close connection with each other. Students will also
be introduced to a large sampling of the non-case materials increasingly
important in public law and will be acquainted with the methods of constitutional advocacy and decision.
*Professor of Public Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. Frank, Constitutional Law: Changes on the Horizon, 3 J.
(1950).
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In his casebook Professor Frank has sought to achieve his objectives
in part by arranging the contents historically. The material in the book is
divided into sections based on time periods. Within each period, under
the title Protection of the Commercial Interest, the commerce clause,
the contracts clause, and, in the four most recent periods, the due process
and equal protection clauses, are studied against the background of text
materials. These texts, in part written by the author and in part portions
of the illustrative non-case literature, fill in the principal social and economic characteristics of each period, and also acquaint the students by
brief biographical sketches with the leading judges then sitting on the
Supreme Court. Each time period, save one, also contains a section entitled, The Rights of the People, in which questions of civil rights and
civil liberties are posed. Three sections at the end of the book deal with
three areas which raise contemporary issues largely unresolved by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Notes following almost every case
not only add, in many instances, to the students' understanding of the
setting in which the case was decided, but also contain incisive statements
of doctrinal analysis.
In my opinion, Professor Frank's skillful use of an historical arrangement is a very effective way of achieving most of his objectives-at least,
when the discussion centers about the portions of the Constitution usually
involved when regulations of business are tested. As the nation developed
and as its economic problems changed, clashing ideas about the proper
role of government in the economy were reflected in the constitutional
opinions of differing Supreme Court justices. The law which emerged
reflects the economic problems, the ideas, and the justices. A course of
study, if reasonably realistic, ought to include materials bearing on these
three factors. They are more revealing than doctrines in predicting the
outcomes of cases. Functionally similar doctrines drawn from different
sections of the Constitution present the court with alternative grounds for
decision. Due process will do as well as equal protection; perhaps the
contracts clause may furnish the opportunity for Court intervention.
During given historical periods constitutional doctrines tend to achieve a
kind of consistency with things more fundamental. A Court which believes deeply that the power of the government to intrude in economic
affairs should be limited will find state statutes unconstitutional as violations of due process or as violations of the commerce clause (negative
aspect), and will strike at federal regulations under the commerce clause
(affirmative aspect) as well as under the Fifth Amendment. Hence,
awareness of ideas, economic problems, and the justices themselves, in
addition to the doctrines created, strengthens student understanding of
the Court and its role.
There may also be another justification for historical study. In answer
to some correspondence about Professor Frank's book, a friend of mine
has recently written, "I have an objection of a general character. Roman
law used to be taught in Germany and France as a system. After the
adoption of codes which absorbed much of it but repealed all previous
statutory and decisional law, the most enlightened scholars of Roman law
shifted to a purely historical treatment of the subject. There is some
intimation in an historical approach that the subject is dead. It seems to
me that our constitutional law has not yet reached the point at which a
subject becomes history." I wonder. Is it too much-to say that some
aspects of the subject are dead? No teacher of constitutional law who
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has tried to devise a sane examination question designed to raise speculation concerning the outer limits of federal commerce power can fail to
agree that the issue of the commerce clause, in its affirmative aspects (for
the moment at least), is dead. No state economic regulatory legislation
has violated substantive due process since 1937. The equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been equally inactive in so far
as the clause is applicable to statutes regulating economic affairs. Again,
the contracts clause of the Constitution has shown no signs of vitality in
recent years. If we are to give our students some feeling of the issues
which have torn an earlier day; if we are to show them how the Supreme
Court can stand as a road block in the midst of a government's attempt
to pull out of near economic chaos, we (for the moment) will have to
resort to history to do the job. In short, it may be true that to study a
subject historically is to admit that it is dead; yet for some aspects of
constitutional law, this qualification for historical study has been met.
Indeed it seems to me that Professor Frank's historical treatment of
civil rights and civil liberties,,much livelier constitutional issues today, does
not come off nearly so well as his selection of material on the Protection
of the Commercial Interest. First of all, unlike the materials on protection of the commercial interest, a common set of problems is not carried
through by Professor Frank from one time period to the next. For
example, The Marshall Era (Chapter 2) contains in the section Liberties
of the People, the Sedition Act of 1798 and some contemporary reactions
to it; The Taney Era (Chapter 3) contains readings on some problems of
Negro slavery and cuttings on American nativism and anti-Catholicism;
Chapter 4 presents three diverse civil and political rights cases, together
with Ex Parte Milligan, upon the question of the power of the military;
yet Chapter 5 contains no civil liberties section at all, and only in Chapter
6 do we pick up cases dealing with free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, Professor Frank shows us something of the
recurring nature of civil rights and rivil liberties issues by these selections
from history, but in general the history is not directly related to modern
development. A book, even a casebook, constructed on historical bases is in
some sense itself a history, and a history involves the adoption of some
sort of principle on which to build the story of the past. For his commercial materials, Professor Frank has chosen to follow a pattern of the
past drawn largely from the work of Charles A. Beard and his nonMarxian appreciation of the effects of economic influences. To me, the
present and past civil liberties questions do not hang well on that thread.
To this extent, the civil liberties and civil rights cuttings are not only
peripheral to later developments, but are also peripheral to the scheme of
development in each section of the book. Secondly, because the most exciting constitutional discussions of the day concern civil liberties, we have
less interest in their history than in probing the merits of the issues raised.
Bar examinations do not examine on the basis of cases decided by the
Taney Court. Does Professor Frank's casebook adequately discharge an
obligation of reasonable coverage? I have made some comparisons and I
estimate that 75 to 80 per cent of the doctrinal materials covered in older
standard books are also presented in this new book. The crisp-styled notes
are successfully employed to extend the range of the subject matter. Any
danger of leaving a student doctrinally illiterate will arise not from the
book but from the teacher who, while using it, dawdles in the early
chapters.
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Everyone who reviews another's casebook finds faults of omission and
inclusion. Personal interest, Professor Frank has said, dictated his choice
of topics for the section on Contemporary Problems. By the same
standard, I would not have included the materials on Freedom of Communication which raise questions springing from economic monopoly of
the means of communication. I would have selected material on what
seems to me the most pressing civil liberties problem of the day: Communism's Challenge and the Constitution. 2 The multitude of loyalty
oaths, of anti-subversive bills, of legislative investigations, of government loyalty programs presents the most difficult constitutional questions
today. They are, to me, far more exciting than the general topic of how
groups or individuals are deprived, by their poverty, of the rights of expression and communication which economic power and managerial position guarantee to the few. Of course, lack of opportunity to spread ideas
is serious, but more immediately and perhaps more seriously, we face
active repression on the ground of political idea and belief. I would like
to discuss with my class the constitutional questions which these repressions raise.
MONRAI G. PAULSEN*

UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY. By Sheldon and Eleanor
Glueck. New York: Commonwealth Fund. 1950. Pp. 504. $5.00.
After ten years of research, the Gluecks are ready to talk about their
one thousand boys. Five hundred delinquents and five hundred nondelinquents were compared over this period and their statistically significant differences noted. Against the experience of these thousand
boys and the significant causative factors squeezed out of their comparisons, Professor Sheldon Glueck and Dr. Eleanor T. Glueck believe
that the background of a boy whose social adaptability is as yet unknown
can be projected and an accurate prediction made of his chances for
delinquency.
Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency traces the tangled behavior strands
of many carefully selected Boston boys. Traditionally investigated
causative factors such as neighborhood, intelligence, and racial origin
were controlled in this study by hand-picking the boys from the same
type of underprivileged neighborhoods and matching them as to age,
general intelligence, and national origin. The Gluecks come to this work
already recognized throughout the world as careful scientists, original
thinkers, and master explorers in the field of criminal behavior. This
is, therefore, an important book and merits careful study.
In and of itself the construction of the book is noteworthy. Almost a
third of the text is devoted to explaining the technique for the research
project. In this section the Gluecks describe how the boys were picked
and matched, how their personal and family backgrounds were explored,
and how they were tested and examined by way of a physique study,
medical examination, intelligence and achievement tests, Rorschach tests,
2. This happy phrase is the title to an article by Cohen & Fuchs, 34
L. Q. 182, 352 (1948).
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Indiana Law School.
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